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Trade in virtual goods is currently governed by social conventions. This has resul-
ted in a complex network of social contracts being established outside the formal  
legal system. The size of informal secondary markets has transformed virtual envir-
onments from games into transaction spaces. This has been encouraged by operat-
ors and their marketing strategies. The design of virtual environments leads users  
to expect that virtual property will reflect the real world property system. Although 
users speak about ownership, the law may not authorise them to alienate virtual  
goods through the secondary markets. Therefore, transactions are carried out in the  
context of legitimate expectations based on implicit social  conventions. Property  
law theorists tell us that the law develops by recognising and formalising social  
conventions. An analysis of those social conventions and contracts can therefore in-
dicate how and to what extent formal law should be adopted in virtual environ-
ments and what categories of (property) law can best address these new challenges.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Virtual environments1 represent a new online business model with indis-
pensable economic potential. It is no longer sustainable to see virtual worlds 
and social platforms as mere games or places for socialising. Clearly, they 
* misa.stikova@googlemail.com
1 Virtual environment is a online computer system where users can interact through their 
avatars. The best known examples of virtual environments are distributed simulations, 3D 
multiplayer  games that allow for collaboration and interaction of many participants that 
may be separated by large distances. World of Warcraft and Second Life are two of the most 
popular and populated virtual environments. Historically, commercial MMORPGs gained 
early acceptance in the late 1980s and early 1990s when computer game developers applied 
the idea of multiple players engaging in playing simultaneously to the video and computer 
game  genre.  More  information  is  available  for  example  at  Wikipedia,  Virtual  World 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_world [Accessed 30 October 2009].
48 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 4:1
have become more than extra-legal  spheres of community and fun.2 The 
unique characteristics and design of virtual environments will  have to be 
acknowledged by law makers and courts, in order to formalise virtual eco-
nomies and to establish an appropriate legal framework for virtual environ-
ments. This article will explore some of the unique legal issues of this new 
sphere of economic activity.
The scale of economic activity in this new marketplace is  sufficient to 
warrant serious attention. “Virtual worlds are not games: they are transac-
tion spaces,” says David Birch.3 Based on the research of Edward Castro-
nova,4 Birch estimates that since about $400 million was traded in Asian vir-
tual worlds last year, their GDP is already around $8 billion.5 To illustrate, 
Blizzard Entertainment announced that the virtual world now hosts more 
than 2 million subscribers in Europe, more than 2.5 million in North Amer-
ica and approximately 5.5 million in Asia where in peak hours 600,000 are 
online at any one time.6 The monetization of virtual environments has resul-
ted in a powerful marketplace with advanced mechanisms for virtual goods 
purchases. The challenge will be to adapt existing regulation to encompass 
this new sphere of economic activity.
2. VIRTUAL GOODS 
More and more people  go online  and spend time,  effort  and money on 
building their  virtual  identities.  They do not hesitate to purchase virtual 
goods to achieve their objectives. Virtual goods are non-physical objects ex-
isting online – in a game, virtual world or social platform. They have no in-
trinsic  value and,  by  definition,  are intangible.7 Yet  thousands  of  people 
spend real money every day on virtual gifts such as those provided by Face-
book8 or enhancement for their avatars in virtual worlds. Jeremy Liew ex-
plains the motivation behind such behaviour: 
2 Hertz,  E.  2008,  ’Virtual  Property  -  Real-World  Problem’,  The  MTTLR  Blog,  
http://blog.mttlr.org/search?q=Virtual+Property+Protection%3A+Continue+the+Experiment+ 
[Accessed 8 October 2009].
3 Birch, D. 2007, ‘Virtual Worlds: Regulating virtual worlds: current and future issues’,  E-
Commerce Law & Policy,  vol.  9,  no.  1,  http://www.e-comlaw.com/lp/details_results.asp?
ID=1170&Search=Yes [Accessed 26 November 2009].
4 Castronova, E. 2001, ‘Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the 
Cyberian  Frontier’,  SSRN,  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294828
[Accessed 15 October 2008].
5 Birch, op cit note 3 above.
6 Gamasutra  News  Online  2008,  World  of  Warcraft  Hits  10  Million  Subscribers, 
http://www.gamasutra.com/php-bin/news_index.php?story=17062 [Accessed 4 December 2009].
7 Wu, S. 2007, ‘Virtual Goods: the next big business model‘, TechCrunch, http://www.tech-
crunch.com/2007/06/20/virtual-goods-the-next-big-business-model/ [Accessed 4 December 2009].
8 Snyder, C. 2008, ‘What is the Value of Virtual Gift?’, Wired,  http://www.wired.com/epicen-
ter/2008/12/virtual-gifts/ [Accessed 13 December 2009].
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“My theory is that people buy digital goods for the same reason that they  
buy goods in the real world; (i)  to be able to do more, (ii) to build relation-
ships, and (iii) to establish identity.”9
Sales of virtual goods can be divided into three categories: sales of cur-
rency; sales of items, such as weapons, gifts, houses or land; and sales of ac-
counts – the password and login information controlling a specific avatar.10 
Land and currency are under the direct control of operators, and appear to 
be the most regulated categories in Terms of Service. Currency is limited by 
a license available for purchase or free distribution and the operator has the 
absolute  right  to  manage,  regulate,  control,  modify  and/or  eliminate  it.11 
Land is often a prerequisite for advancement through both the game and in 
virtual social structures. A user can choose from developed or undeveloped 
land of many types. The amount, accessibility and quality12 of land are de-
termined by operators. 
Social  conventions  applied  in-world result  from the unique  nature  of 
each virtual environment. In competitive environments, users play to rules 
set by the operator, and so might expect the operator to have unlimited and 
absolute control over the virtual property,13 whereas social platforms consist 
mostly of user-generated content (apart from the basic infrastructure) which 
might  lead to different conventions on property. In some cases,  environ-
ments  are  designed  with  an  in-built  property  model,  which  encourages 
users to trade virtual goods in internal markets; other environments do not 
have such a model. While internal markets may be set up in virtual environ-
ments by their operators, this is not the case for external markets. These in-
formal secondary markets have developed in order to trade virtual goods 
directly for real money. Often the design and structure of virtual environ-
ments  lead  users  to  trade  virtual  goods  amongst  themselves  and  these 
trades become part of the complex network of social contracts.
9 Liew, J. 2009, ‘Why do People Buy Virtual Goods?‘, WSJ.com, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123395867963658435.html [Accessed 30 December 2009].
10 Glushko,  R.  2007,  ‘Tales  of  the  (Virtual)  City:  Governing  Property  Disputes  in  Virtual 
Worlds‘),  Berkley  Technology  Law  Journal,  Vol.  22,  No.  507,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1458547 [Accessed 15 November 2009].
11 Terms  of  Service  are  available  at  Second  Life,  http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php
[Accessed 10 October 2009].
12 Operators usually decide about adding new areas, worlds or galaxies. They also determine 
their design and if they are accessible to all social groups and individuals or to a selected 
class.
13 Virtual property is perceived as persistent, interconnected, and rivalrous. Defining virtual 
property has been the subject of intensive academic debate. For more information see for 
example Fairfield, J.A.T. 2005, ‘Virtual Property’, Boston University Law Review vol. 85, pp. 
1047 - 1049.
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3. ENTREPRENEURIAL ENVIRONMENTS
Some of the virtual environments such as Star Wars Galaxies are based on 
collaborative scenarios of entirely entrepreneurial characters. Yee14 has con-
ducted a psychological research on the participants in virtual environments 
examining some aspects of motivation,  relationships and problematic us-
age.  In his  work,  he describes  the mechanisms of goods production and 
trading in Star Wars Galaxies. All non-basic goods available in the environ-
ment, such as housing, fashion,  etc are produced by users.  He says: “All 
transactions,  and  the  resulting  supply,  demand,  and  pricing  of  specific 
goods, are user-driven. The environment has mechanisms allowing users to 
survey for resources,  harvest those resources,  research schematics  for as-
sembling resources into sub-components,  construct  factories to mass-pro-
duce finished goods, and market those goods to the public. The process is 
so  complex,  time-consuming,  and distributed  over  several  skill  sets  that 
users typically specialize  as resource brokers,  manufacturers,  or retailers, 
and typically form quasi-business entities with other users to facilitate that 
process. These entities have to communicate effectively, develop a coherent 
product  strategy,  assess  market  competition,  and  ensure  the  production 
chain is running smoothly. Many users comment that being part of such en-
tities feels like having a second job.”15
A substantial part of virtual economies is the trade in virtual goods. In 
addition there are institutions such as exchange brokers or currency trading 
houses,  which provide trade within virtual  environments,  either  with or 
without the explicit approval of the operators. These economies operate on 
a similar basis to real world ones. In the past, Sony Online has occasionally 
suspended the accounts of players caught trading items for money. But real-
ising the economic potential, the company has provided an internal trading 
service. Sony facilitates trade between players, but does not sell items dir-
ectly. Sony Online president John Smedley has commented on this: “[t]he 
unsanctioned secondary market for online games is  rapidly growing and 
more and more of our players are taking part in it. Not only are we answer-
ing the demands of a sizable portion of our subscriber base, but we are also 
set on establishing the standard for online game sales.”16 
14 Yee, N. 2006, ‘The Psychology of Massively Multi-User Online Role-Playing Games: Motiva-
tions, Emotional Investment, Relationships and Problematic Usage’, in Schroeder, R., Axel-
son, A. S., ‘Avatars at Work and Play: Collaboration and Interaction in Shared Virtual En-
vironments’, Springer, Netherlands, Chapter 9.
15 Yee, op cit note 14 above.
16 Fox  News  2005,  Sony  Letting  Everquest  Players  Buy,  Sell  Virtual  Items,  http://www.-
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,154206,00.html [Accessed 4 December 2009].
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Operators are not the only ones who are showing interest in regulating 
virtual  economies.  Governments  have  adopted  different  regulatory  ap-
proaches. The UK and USA opt for laissez-faire while Asia-Pacific legal sys-
tems tend to be more paternalistic and choose immediate legislation.17 For 
example, the South Korean government has adopted strict measures to reg-
ulate this new sphere of economic activity. David Birch reports that they 
have decided to pass a bill banning transactions between the real and virtu-
al worlds. If the proposed 'Amendment for Game Industry Promoting Law' 
is passed by the National Assembly, then all kinds of businesses brokering 
between virtual money and real money could be fined. This clause is added 
to the bill prohibiting virtual world trading.18
Kane concludes that: ”...the commercialization of virtual environments 
will result in the online industry being subjected to real world laws and reg-
ulations as users seek to monetize the value in virtual property”.19 It is, after 
all, the authorities who define what is and what is not considered property, 
especially for tax reasons. From the perspective of a state, anything a person 
owns in a broad sense that has a value is property for taxing purposes.20 
Law makers, courts and scholars have been turning their attention to virtual 
environments and the growing economic activity, exactly because of its eco-
nomic potential. Currently, these transactions are not recognised by formal 
legal rules and are governed on an informal level through social conven-
tions.
4. SOCIAL CONVENTIONS IN VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS 
Social conventions and rules are a fundamental precondition for the stabil-
ity, efficiency, and inner coherence of a social system. They are normative 
rules of conduct which are based on implicit ethical imperatives. Group or 
community members accept these rules even if they have the opportunity to 
behave differently. Social conventions not only determine what behaviour is 
desirable, but they also tell us what behaviour is anti-social. These rules can 
be articulated by explicit agreements, or even laws, which have been estab-
lished by institutions or responsible persons. However, more often, social 
17 Birch, D. 2007, ‘Virtual Money: Money laundering in virtual worlds: risks and reality’, E-
Commerce Law & Policy,  vol.  9,  no.  5,  http://www.e-comlaw.com/lp/details_results.asp?
ID=1216&Search=Yes [Accessed 26 November 2009].
18 Birch, op cit note 17 above.
19 Kane,  S.  F.  2007,  ‘Virtual  Worlds:  'Passporting'  of  avatars  and property between virtual 
Works’,  E-Commerce Law & Policy,  vol.  9,  no.  12,  http://www.e-comlaw.com/lp/details_
results.asp?ID=1300&Search=Yes [Accessed 26 November 2009]
20 Miller, D. 2008, ’Economics of Virtual Worlds: Virtual Inheritance‘, http://economicsofvirtu-
alworlds.blogspot.com/2008/09/virtual-inheritance.html [Accessed 13 December 2009].
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conventions are implicit. They determine the behaviour of members of a so-
cial system without being codified or formulated.21
There are such implicit rules in virtual environments and they take vari-
ous forms. Some rules are general guidelines on social interaction between 
users, e.g. greetings, group interaction or respecting privacy. Some are de-
tailed policies regulating specific area of community life. It is the interaction 
between players that makes virtual environments so attractive. Therefore 
users  participate  in  some  sort  of  organisation,  such  as  tribes,  factions, 
guilds, clans, and racial (or species) groupings. These organisations repres-
ent different types of collaboration, for example combat groups (temporary 
collaborations between a few users),  guilds (persistent user-created mem-
bership  organizations),  and  ideological  alliances  (agreements  between 
guilds or “racial” groups).22 Avatars can “marry” or have children. Eventu-
ally, they can also experience something akin to death – an avatar cannot 
die in the virtual environment, but usually he would be teleported to his 
home base or return to the beginning of the game and would be forced to 
start all over again.23 These situations may have various implications. For 
example, in the case of “virtual” death caused in combat, the virtual prop-
erty of the deceased is taken by the winning party. World of Warcraft en-
courages guild leaders to use an elaborate Guild Distribution Loot System. 
Choosing the right distribution loot system in end game raids is one of cru-
cial decision they have to make to sustain a smoothly and effectively run-
ning organisation.24 What happens with the virtual assets once a player dies 
in the real world? Some operators have decided to allow residents of virtual 
worlds to draw up wills to allocate rights to the deceased’s virtual assets. 
This development is hardly unexpected as it is another way for them to in-
crease revenues. MindArk Chief Marketing Officer Carl Uggla says: “There 
is land in the game of considerable value which if the player would die is 
uncertain who would claim [it].”25 
Virtual environments can have authorities that exercise police powers, 
and different games could include different rules limiting the freedom of ac-
21 Becker, B., Mark, G. 2004, ’Social Conventions in Collaborative Virtual Environments’, Stan-
ford  University,  http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/154/Workshop/Becker%20Social
%20Conventions%20in%20Collaborative%20Virtual%20Environments.pdf  [Accessed  13 
December 2009].
22 Yee, op cit note 14 above.
23 Pompolio,  N.  2008,  ‘Death  in  Second  Life‘,  Obit  Magazine,  http://obit-mag.com/articles/
death-in-second-life [Accessed 13 December 2009]. 
24 World of Warcraft Forum, Guild Loot Distribution System, http://forums.worldofwarcraft.com/
thread.html?topicId=14733001&sid=1 [Accessed 18 December 2009].
25 Entropia Forum, Article about Virtual Wills in Entropia, http://www.entropiaforum.com/
forums/general-discussion/125367-article-about-virtual-wills-entropia.html  [Accessed  18 
December 2009].
2010] M. Štiková: More than Just a Game 53
tion of the policing authorities.26 For example, LambdaMOO implemented a 
petition mechanism in 1993, allowing the community to propose and vote 
on new policies and other administrative actions. A petition may be created 
by anyone eligible to participate in politics.27
Whereas Terms of Service28 govern only relationships between operators 
and users, social conventions refer to a wider range of relationships. They 
are the informal framework that backs up the virtual economies.
5. FORMALISING SOCIAL CONTRACTS
In his book The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and  
Fails Everywhere Else,29 the Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto explains 
that lack of assets in poor, post communist countries does not prevent capit-
alism from flourishing. He sees the real problem in the lack of a formalised 
property system. In order to make capitalism flourish, it is necessary to es-
tablish and normalize the invisible network of laws that turns dead assets 
into  liquid  capital.  He believes  such  a  change  can  be  achieved  focusing 
upon  building  a  legally  integrated  property  system  that  can  convert 
people’s work and savings into capital. He says that property rights precede 
money. In order to earn on borrowed money, a person can loan or secure 
against it some kind of property document that establishes his legal title. To 
summarise,  money cannot be earned without  established and formalised 
property rights.30
During  his  extensive  research  in  various  countries  he  found out  that 
people  still  engage  in  accumulating  wealth,  trading  and  building  new 
houses. There is a whole separate world of underground trade, services and 
building  industry  existing  outside  the  formal  legal  system.  He  acknow-
ledges these activities as a complex network of social contracts. Their exist-
ence is easily explained – they accommodate the needs of people, because 
the rigid formal system does not have appropriate and functional tools to 
address them. De Soto suggests that governments must find the real social 
contracts on property that can be subsequently integrated into the official 
26 Bradley, C. M., Froomkin, A. M. 2004, ’Virtual Worlds, Real Rules’, New York Law School 
Law Review, vol. 49, no. 2008-22, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1127722 [Accessed 14 December 
2009].
27 Wikipedia, LambdaMOO, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LambdaMOO [Accessed 30 Decem-
ber 2009].
28 They are contracts stipulating terms and conditions of using the virtual environment. They 
are known as End User License Agreements (EULA) or Terms of Service (TOS).
29 De Soto, H. 2000, ‘Mystery of Capital:  Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else’, Basic Books, New York.
30 De Soto, op cit note 29 above, p 64.
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law.  No  reform  can  be  entirely  successful  and  efficient  without  encom-
passing the network of social contracts.31
His theory is based on the evolution of property rights in North America 
and over several generations. Harold Berman commented on the develop-
ment of property rights in the following way. ”The systematization of law 
within various communities ... was possible only because there had previ-
ously developed an informal structure of legal relations in those communit-
ies... The Western legal tradition grew - in the past - out of the structure of 
social  and economic  interrelationships  within  and among groups on the 
ground. All property rights spring from social recognition of a claim’s legit-
imacy. Behavioural patterns of interrelationship acquired normative dimen-
sions: usages were transformed into custom and custom into law.”32
If De Soto and Berman are correct, then an analysis of the social conven-
tions and contracts in virtual environments may tell us how to adapt real 
world property law, in order to apply it on virtual property.
6. BRAGG V LINDEN CASE
This case illustrates how informal conventions and contracts may be turned 
into formal law. The dispute centred on two things – were the Terms of Ser-
vice enforceable and if virtual goods acquired in virtual environments can 
be interpreted as virtual property. The law-suit resulted from confiscation 
of virtual property owned by Marc Bragg in Second Life. In October 2006, 
Marc Bragg filed a lawsuit to recover the value of land, account funds, small 
business products and personal objects that were allegedly wrongfully con-
fiscated by Linden Lab, the defendant. It was undisputed that Bragg owned 
the property when it was taken.33 Bragg appeared to have a strong case es-
pecially because Linden Lab and the company’s representatives encouraged 
users to believe that a purchase of virtual land and other items resulted in 
acquiring ownership. 
Bragg participated in Second Life from 2005 until his account was ter-
minated in May 2006 due to alleged fraud. The alleged fraud took place on 
the 30th April 2006, when Bragg purchased a region of virtual land through 
an unpublished (and unauthorized) auction. This type of auction was con-
sidered a platform exploit, of which Bragg was aware. The standard proced-
ure was to participate in a public auction authorised by Linden Lab with a 
minimum bid of $1,000.00 for a land region. Bragg, with the help of other 
31 De Soto, op cit note 29 above, p 152.
32 Berman, H. J. 1983, ‘Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition’, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 555-556.
33 Glushko, op cit note 10 above.
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players, took place in an unauthorized auction of an unreleased land region. 
The starting bid was $0 and Bragg won the auction with a bid of $300.01. 
Participation in the unauthorized auction constituted violation of the rules 
of the game. This resulted in suspension of Bragg's account, which was sub-
sequently terminated. Pursuant to its Terms of Service, Linden Lab did not 
refund any of Bragg's money.34
Firstly,  the  court  invalidated  the  arbitration  clause  in  Linden  Lab’s 
Terms of Service as unconscionable. As a result, Bragg was permitted to sue 
Linden Lab in federal court, which eventually led Linden Lab to settle the 
case. This suggests they strongly believed the court would not enforce the 
other  contractual  terms.  Secondly,  the  judges appeared to be  inclined  to 
treat the case as a virtual property dispute - not as a contract dispute. This is 
apparent from their statement that reads: “[t]his case is about virtual prop-
erty maintained on a virtual world on the Internet.”35 
Based on the material evidence, Linden Lab’s position was weakened by 
the  controversy  between  their  public  statements  and  formal  contractual 
terms. “We believe our new policy recognizes the fact that persistent world 
users  are  making  significant  contributions  to  building  these  worlds  and 
should be able to both own the content they create and share in the value 
that is created. The preservation of users' property rights is a necessary step 
toward the emergence of genuinely real online worlds.”36 “Land ownership 
feels important and tangible. It's a real piece of the future.”37 
The license  agreement grants the right to confiscate and sell  property 
owned by a player, and this, in light of its public statements, would likely 
run contrary to player expectations.38 Users were encouraged to accumulate 
property, which ultimately resulted in rise of new markets and transaction 
spaces.  As a consequence, Linden Lab has changed its position regarding 
property and now offers the following description: “When you have land in 
Second Life,  you're  actually  renting  storage/server  space  at  Linden  Lab. 
Each piece of land takes up a certain amount of dedicated storage space - 
34 Dougherty, C. 2007, ’Virtual Worlds: Bragg v Linden: virtual property rights litigation’, E-
Commerce Law & Policy,  vol.  9,  no.  7,  http://www.e-comlaw.com/lp/details_results.asp?
ID=1236&Search=Yes [Accessed 26 November 2009].
35 MARC BRAGG, Plaintiff, v. LINDEN RESEARCH, INC. and PHILIP ROSEDALE, Defend-
ants. CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-4925. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39516.
36 Linden Lab 2003, Linden Lab Preserves Real World Intellectual Property Rights of Users of 
its  Second  Life  Online  Services,  http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/03_11_14
[Accessed 18 November 2009].
37 Learmonth,  M.  2004,  ’Virtual  Real  Estate  Boom  Draws  Real  Dollars’,  USA  Today, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2004-06-03-virtual-realty_x.htm  
[Accessed 12 December 2009].
38 Glushko, op cit note 10 above.
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the more land, the more space. So, it's like renting a hard drive.”39 Their pos-
ition has shifted considerably.  Linden Lab has realised the legal implica-
tions of their statements and the possibility that courts would acknowledge 
users’ rights in virtual property. This would inevitably lead to their losing 
their exclusive control over the environment and the rise of new liabilities.
7. TERMS OF SERVICE AND PLAYERS’ EXPECTATIONS
The formal governance of virtual environments is based on Terms of Ser-
vice. The license agreement sets down the basic principles that regulate in-
teractions between operators and users and amongst users themselves. It is 
common  to  find  clauses  regarding  ownership  of  intellectual  property, 
clauses granting immunity to operators against suit and limiting their liabil-
ity  towards users.  Frequently,  they  define  prohibited  behaviour,  such  as 
theft,  harassment,  or  sexist  and homophobic  speech.  The clauses  can be 
more specific and ban “pyramid schemes and chain letters,” and “violating 
any local,  state,  national,  or international  laws or regulations.”40 To sum-
marise, Terms of Service are a tool that allows: “...[operators to] retain an 
extensive right to control the importation of physical  world material into 
the virtual world and have wide latitude to take action against players in 
the virtual world, such as suspending service, confiscating property, or ter-
minating accounts”.41
The utmost interest of operators is to regulate interactions between play-
ers to a certain extent. An operator is a necessary authority that can enforce 
rights between users and intervene in case of an “unlawful” behaviour in 
the virtual environment. In 2006, an avatar called Cally in the virtual world 
called EVE Online  created the Eve Investment Bank. It was a corporation 
that took deposits of players’ virtual money for safekeeping as this virtual 
world is designed to be a place most hostile and dangerous. The venture 
was successful and during nine months took in virtual currency equalling 
nearly $125,000. Unfortunately, it was a fraud and Cally disappeared with 
all the money. Despite the quantity of complaints and general dissatisfac-
tion, the operator refused to delete Cally’s account and return the custom-
ers’ savings.42 The EVE Investment Bank scandal shows that users rely on 
operators as governing authorities and the lack of action on their side to 
39 Second  Life,  Buy  Land:  Frequently  Asked  Questions,  http://secondlife.com/land/faq/?
lang=en-US [Accessed 15 November 2009].
40 EVE  Online,  Terms  of  Service,  http://www.eveonline.com/pnp/terms.asp  [Accessed  29 
December 2009].
41 Glushko, op cit note 10 above.
42 Pollack, P. 2006, ‘Online ‘banker’ runs off with cash, avatars cry foul’, ARSTECHNICA, 
 http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060828-7605.html [Accessed 11 November 2009].
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protect users’ virtual property and investments appears to be contradictory 
to the purpose of Terms of Service.
Operators do not regard it to be in their interest if users acquire property 
rights enforceable against the operator. The Bragg v Linden case leads to 
this  conclusion.  Linden  Lab  publicly  promoted  ownership  and property 
rights to virtual goods and land, but the Terms of Service granted no such 
rights. In general, operators’ motivation is to attract more users, more sub-
scriptions,  higher  revenues.  In  order  to  make  their  virtual  environment 
more appealing they can introduce in-world property system, internal trad-
ing services or virtual wills.  To the contrary, Terms of Service guarantee 
contractually their position with absolute and ultimate control over the vir-
tual environment and limited liability towards users. The license agreement 
also serves as a tool to control users’  expectations as the cases of Linden 
Lab, Sony or MindArk illustrate.
The effectiveness of this approach is in question. Users usually do not 
read through the license agreements in detail. Operators often do not com-
ply with their own terms or public statements. In addition, license agree-
ments are drafted in a rather poor and one-sided way. Operators have a sole 
discretion to enforce the rights and obligations and they do so with variable 
outcomes. Due to this inconsistency it is possible that users might still ac-
quire legitimate expectations about property rights enforceable against op-
erators. “Much like in the physical world, acquiring and trading property 
leads to a need for legal regulation”, says Glushko.43
8. CONCLUSION
Virtual environments have proved to be a new sphere of economic activity. 
They were  transformed from mere  games  and socialising  platforms into 
transaction spaces.  Entirely new online business models have been identi-
fied. Through the design and marketing strategies users are encouraged to 
trade and acquire virtual goods. Institution such as brokers, banks and cur-
rency trading houses  have been established  in  virtual  environments.  To-
gether with trading they are the essential parts of virtual economy. 
Currently, trading virtual goods and the concept of virtual property is 
governed by implicit social conventions in virtual environments. With the 
growing importance of virtual economies, it is crucial that players’ legitim-
ate  expectations  about  the  alienability,  value  and  inviolability  of  virtual 
goods are translated into reality and backed up by formal legal system. Le-
gislation has not kept pace with the development of virtual environments 
43 Glushko, op cit note 10 above.
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and therefore until now the acquisition of virtual goods remains in a legal 
vacuum. An analysis of these invisible conventions and contracts is essen-
tial in order to formalise and integrate them into a formal legal system. 
The  Bragg  v  Linden  case  shows  a  complex  triangular  relationship 
between the virtual economy, the Terms of Service governing the virtual en-
vironment and users’  expectations.  Despite limiting their  liability and re-
luctance to enforce users’ property, there is a possibility that the law will re-
cognise the informal social  contracts and users’  expectations by granting 
them property rights enforceable against operators.
